In this section, we tell you how Inter-City brand and subsequent story evolved, from inception to privatisation. Rail-Blue Charters wanted to create a theme from years past to reflect not only a past era, but also to try and keep the 'Inter-City' brand in hearts and minds after all this time. Even after what seems a short time, it is infact 20 years since rail blue and grey started to disappear, the white Rail Alphabet 'Inter-City' logo with it.
Some of the text below has been reproduced from the excellent book 'The InterCity Story' pubished by OPC in 1994. Although out of print, it is an excellent read if you can find a copy.
The Beeching report of 1963 was the first occasion when the term 'Inter-City' was loosely used to describe the long distance rail network. The specific words had been used in a rail context on 25th September 1950 then the Western Region gave the name 'The Inter-City' to it's 09.00 Paddington - Wolverhampton service and it's return. It went through changes, such as being extended to Chester in 1962, but was dropped altogether in 1965 as the Inter-City title was to be used for the new electric services from Liverpool and Manchester to London Euston.
The 'Inter-City' word was also used to describe the new diesel units that were introduced in 1957 between Edinburgh and Glasgow. It was also applied to new units being built in 1963 for services between Cardiff and Derby and Cardiff and Bristol by nature of the cities they served.
Finally, BR's Corporate Identity Programme of 1965 started to distinguish between the all over blue to be applied to locomotives and stopping trains and the BR blue and grey to be applied to faster express services. See the 'Rail Blue' section for more detail.
One of the most significant dates in the Inter-City story is 18th April 1966. This is when the Manchester - Liverpool to London Euston section of the West Coast Mainline electrification was completed. For the first time, even interval timetabled trains operated over this corridor at speeds of 100mph.
The success was phenomenal - passenger traffic went up by 66% compared to the previous year before completion. However, instead of naming singular trains as had been the traditional practice, the whole service was branded 'Inter-City'. This reflected in the promotion and advertising of the new service. Instead of station posters as the sole advertising media, TV commercials, mailshots, leaflets and newspaper ads were introduced. The essence of this was that the railway had never done this before and commercial marketing techniques proved effective and successful.
Inter-City begain advertising using more powerful medias too. Bear in mind that in the late 1960's and early 1970's TV was still evolving as an advertising tool. Follow the link below:
http://youtube.com/watch?v=gPdq-KJaa8Q&feature+related
Another successful route to market was that of the Travel Centre, which could now deal with integrated advanced ticket purchases, information, reservations and journey planning. Taken for granted now and even superceded somewhat by the internet and call centres, back in 1967, when the first such centre was opened at Birmingham New Street, it was revolutionary.
The new locomotives and rolling stock built for these services would also form the backbone of the interval-timetable service. A key development taken in 1969 by the BR Board would also see a switch to air-conditioned vehicles (MkII d/e/f) for Inter-City services, regardless of class of travel. This decision would carry Inter-City through the 1970s and beyond.
87028 at Northampton at the turn of the 1980s. Although the carriages carried the label (not brand!) of 'Inter-City', locomotives did not. Surprising, when 'Inter-City 125' worked so well on HSTs.
Interestingly, the success of HST through the late 70s onwards, had overshadowed the first route to undergo modernisation, the West Coast Main Line. A large tranche of locomotive hauled MkIII carriages had helped, but 1960s locomotives with 1970s MkIIs were underpinning the service with 100mph maximum speeds. Even the MkIII stock didn't see 110mph until the mid 1980s as InterCity, as it was to become (the hyphen was dropped and the brand name became a BR sector in it's own right), took a tighter hold of the route in terms of trying 'to do something with it'.
In the 'Inter-City 125' section, mention is made of the gas turbine APT project had failed to meet expectations. 3 prototype electric APT sets were ordered to work on the Euston - Glasgow route with an intention to operate in squadron service after the prototypes has proved themselves.
Problems manifested themselves. BR was not allowed to build driving power cars with pantographs as one pantograph raised at each end would have created a 'bounce' in the contact wire at speed. BR was not allowed to run a power line along the roof (as per the French TGV fleet) to overcome this, so two non-driving cars we placed in the centre of the train. Not ideal, as passenger could not walk through the power cars for obvious reasons.
The train also deployed a hydro-kinetic brake. Disc brakes as installed on the MkIII coaches were not enough to slow the train over the required distance between existing signals, so a hollow axle with water turbines was fitted. The churning action when water was released into the axle slowed the train.
Then there was the tilt action. It was good - so good in fact that it often fooled the passenger into thinking the train was upright when it was actually tilting. However, this 'deception' could cause nausea and discomfort in some passengers when they recognised that the train was tiliting.
Following the prototypes, a fleet was due to be introduced, firstly in 1977, then 1980 and then 1983. The start dates kept slipping. In April 1980 bolts holding one of the axles together failed at 125mph and the train derailed. Nobody was hurt, but the project never seemed to recover from this.
However, on the 7th December 1980, APT went revenue-earning. The first run was faultless, leaving Glasgow at 0700 and getting into Euston at 11.15. It averaged 102mph between Preston and London and peaked at 137mph. However further runs were hit with everything from chafing wires to tilt failures to freezing brake pipes. Service running lasted one week before being discontinued.
By 1982 and the creation of sectors, the fledgling Inter-City sector decided it did not need APT and started looking at a derivative which eventually metamorphasised into the IC225. Gone were the hydro-kinetic brakes to be replaced by conventional disc brakes. The power cars became the Class 91 and the APT trailers changed into the MkVI carriage. The tantalising link to the APT was however, the tapered profile of the carriages and locos, should tilt equipment ever be installed. IC225 became the common design intended for both the East Coast and West Coast routes. However tilt equipment was never installed on the East Coast IC225 fleet and West Coast had to wait over 20 years for it's tilting Pendolino fleet.
So that was the end of APT. It was a pity in some ways as the technical problems had by then been ironed out and the train was operating reliably. However, it needs to be observed that the sets that ran were prototypes and never intended for revenue earning service indefinitely.
APT definitely saved it's best for last. On the 12th December 1984, it covered London Euston to Glasgow Central in 3 hours 52 minutes and 45 seconds. It has taken over 20 years for Pendolino to beat that...
The iconic HST at speed. The HST saved Inter-City in the 1970s and began to attack the motorway competition in the form of the car and coach. Later, that would include the air market.
This section can do little justice to the High Speed Train or HST. The 'Inter-City 125' as it was branded, has been to date, the most successful passenger train to operate on the UK rail network. To say it saved the Inter-City business is an understatement. We'll go no further than to say that the HST's success is in it's longevity and nothing has come close to surpassing it in 30 years.
By the end of the 1960's, there was agreement within BR that average journey times had be reduced. If Inter-City was to survive in a market where Government investment and technical development favoured the car, the coach and the plane, something had to be done quickly. But the way forward divided engineers and managers alike. In December 1968, BR Research finally got funding for Advanced Passenger Train (APT), a train that would achieve up to 150mph on existing track. Even though the electric trains on the West Coast and 'Deltic' locomotives on the East Coast were doing well and pulling in business, this was seen as 'yesterday's technology' compared to the Research Division's vision of a gas-turbine powered tilting 150mph train...
BR appointed a new Chief Engineer, Traction and Rolling Stock, in 1968. His name was Terry Miller. Miler was the right man at the right time. He could see that success on the West and East Coast routes could be delivered by conventional technology and could deliver change again - and quickly.
He was fortunate that most of that technology was available. His engineers had already started working on a new kind of coach, the MkIII and Miller had already decided that this stock should have a design speed of 125mph. The over-riding feature of this stock required it to be able to operate in the same 'envelope' as other conventional, slower trains, i.e. to accelerate harder, brake more quickly and encompass existing topography of conventional routes. This allowed use of such stock on existing routes without having to re-site signals and re-align track. So out went clasp brakes and spring suspension and in came disc brakes, air-suspension and air-smoothed aerodynamics. 7 or 8 of these vehicles sandwiched between 2 x 2,250hp power cars weighing 68 tonnes each, offered a high power to weight ratio, fantastic acceleration and more importantly, the ability to cruise effortlessly at 125mph.
It was at this time that the technical challenges of APT were beginning to worry BR's commercial managers. So when Miller offered them a 125mph diesel train in under two years, the BR Board had little difficulty in agreeing.
In June 1972, the prototype HST set rolled out, ironically only a month after the gas-turbine APT prototype. The HST prototype soon began to display it's potential. On the 12th June 1973, it hit 143mph between York and Darlington. The MkIII carriages, the cheapest and lightest steel built air-conditioned carriages in Europe, gave a quality of ride, even on poor track that other builds have struggled to emulate. The quiet ride and acceleration made the train a winner right from the start.
The Western Region Paddington - Bristol - South Wales Great Western main line was chosen as the first route to receive the new HSTs. The route had suffered, not being able to compete with the car and coach on the parallel M4 motorway. Now Inter-City had a weapon that could do real damage. On Monday 4th October 1976, 16 HSTs went into service. With stations like Bristol Parkway being only 70 minutes from Paddington (a start stop average speed of 96mph) the new HST service fought back against the M4 corridor. Lured by the smooth, sound proofed 125mph trains, passengers poured in in their thousands. The marketing revolution had started.
Inter-City advert for the Inter-City 125:
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=iN7naLLeB0A&feature=related
The Journey Shrinker - it's exactly what the HST did - even when not running at 125mph for sustained periods.
The next route to benefit would be the East Coast Main Line. The 'Deltic' locomotives could be phased out by the early 1980's having done 20 years service. Sets were gradually introduced on to the route. However at the turn of the 1980's, Britain was in recession and BR was having to fight for justification for every single new HST train.
Slowly, business cases were agreed for an extension of HST services to the West of England, a complete East Coast service and even a limited investment for Cross Country services. Limited for the latter, because BR wanted 36 sets, but only got 18. Likewise, it wanted 7 extra sets for alleviating overcrowding on the East Coast route and adding Middlesbrough, Sheffield and Hull to the HST network. BR got 2, although the Department of Transport relented and increased the build to 4. The set total came to 95 - and stayed there. It was a far cry from the 161 sets BR wanted. As well as adding additional capacity to cope with demand, BR wanted to add North West to South West routes and those to South Coast destinations for Cross Country, Newcastle - Liverpool, Midland Mainline and Edinburgh - Glasgow to the wishlist. Only when BR was re-organised into business sectors in 1982 was the newly created infant 'Inter-City sector' allowed to reallocate HST sets to the most profitable routes. Midland Mainline benefited from this at last, receiving an allocation in 1983, pulling in odd sets from East Coast, Great Western and Cross Country routes to make up the fleet.
In the mid-1980's the HSTs began to receive a refurbishment into InterCity colours (the hyphen was also dropped by the 1990s) and as the InterCity sector became a stand alone business, all 95 sets became part of the asset portfolio. The routes remained much the same until the East Coast route electrification was completed in 1991. Then a cascade could take place, with more sets drafted into Cross Country to cover those North West - South West/South Coast destinations referred to earlier, the Paddington - Plymouth - Penzance route and also on to the London Euston - Holyhead route saving a locomotive change at Crewe.
As privatisation bit, the future looked uneasy for the HST fleet. Virgin took over Cross Country and West Coast and the Cross Country sets were the first to be stood down, replaced by the new Voyager trains. Many saw this as a retrograde step, the new trains being shorter, tapered to tilt and developing power from underfloor engines which made for a noisier, more claustrophobic environment.
Some HSTs found a new lease of life with other operators and also as part of a Strategic Rail Authority sponsored 'Project Rio' exercise to create an alternative Manchester-St.Pancras service while the West Coast was being upgraded. However, many sets sat out of use until very recently, when new franchises specified extra trains to cope with overcrowding. In a twist of irony, 5 HST sets are being returned to Cross Country routes to ease such overcrowding. We suspect they will be welcomed back with open arms...
With heavy refurbishments and re-engineering taking place on the fleet, the future looks rosy for many years yet. All HST power cars and trailers will all be back in service until 'HST2' or what is now titled the 'IEP' or 'Intercity Express Project' gains momentum. That word 'InterCity' again!
However it will always be seen as the train that saved BR's long distance passenger business with such panache and distinctiveness.
A typcial view of mid 1980s InterCity - the then new 'Executive' livery applied here to 47622 at Reading. Such mixed rakes were commonplace into the 1990s
The creation of sector management by BR in 1982, saw Inter-City become InterCity and start to develop a marketing stance over the next few years. Out went the corporate blue grey livery of the carriages and the rail blue of the locomotives. An 'executive' livery of light and dark grey with a red band was devised and rapidly applied from the mid to late 1980s to all InterCity 'assets'. This was the start of a clear and consistent approach.
Initiatives came fast; the relaunch of Pullman in 1985 helped deliver an extra revenue streams as InterCity too on the air market as well as the car, competing over the major 2-3 hour journey markets. West Coast even managed to make the business case for 36 MkIIIb first class vehicles to help deliver this service. Other marketing ideas were the launch of an in-house magazine, customer guides and specific car parking. It was start of specific theming and branding.
Other developments came about on othe routes, such as upgrading the West Coast and Midland Main Lines to 110mph and introducing DVTs onto West Coast along with new Class 90 locomotives to replace the first generation electrics that had delivered the first benefits of electrification in the 1960s.
The major InterCity project of the 1980s had to be the commissioning of the East Coast Main Line electrification. Costing £306m at mid-80s prices it included a fleet of new trains as well as infrastructure and signalling improvements. It would conclude in 1991 and allow a major cascade of HST trains to the rest of the InterCity network.
91022 at King's Cross. This livery was the final application of Intercity livery, with the lettering in italics and the 'swallow' emblem to personify the brand. The InterCity 225 as the train was titled, became a brand in it's own right.
By 1990, InterCity was a small commercial business employing about 5,400 people. It effectively linked Britain's major cities and ran without subsidy. The business was very dependent on the six major geographies it operated through, namely the BR Regions. These regions had their own cultures, histories and business focus. They also provided the stations, lines and assets.
A new organisation called 'Organising for Quality' did away with this and effectively turned the Regions' general managers into route specific Directors. By April 1991, the major radial InterCity routes into London became integrated into the InterCity business. In April 1992, The London Midland Region was abolished and InterCity had 6 major routes; West Coast, East Coast, Midland Mainline, Anglia/Gatwick Express, Great Western and Cross Country. It brought the providers of the services under one business unit umbrella and provided the tools, assets and resources to deliver them.
InterCity became a business and a railway company in one - it owned it's assets and employed it's own staff. It also managed it's £1bn balance sheet.
if anything, Organising for Quality came too late over the years (1990-1993). By the time it was completed in April 1992 for example, the reorganisation redeployed staff that saw an increase to 30,000 people. Privatisation loomed and it was seen as too short a time to deliver the unified vision required after such a heavy restructure.
However, the InterCity marketing and branding awareness worked overtime through the early years of the 1990s. Britain was once again in recession and drives such as 'quality by profit' initiatives allowed maximisation of assets and increased productivity to allow profits to be maintained. In 1993-4 InterCity delivered a £100 million profit, a sizable achievement given the economic conditions at the time.
Intercity really pushed it's marketing in this period with a heavy TV ad campaign. Follow the link below to see these contrasting ads. We can't resist the second one - after all, when did you see an ad selling the virtues of the overnight sleeper service so well!
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=L1CdO8DJJa0
http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=XFiIyl2MyHM&NR=1
However, there was to be little investment. InterCity 250, the upgrade proposed for the West Coast, foundered, the Treasury preferring to wait until the dust had settled from the 1993 Railways Act, pre-privatisation. InterCity had even lost out in the £150m 'leasing' deal offered by the Government for new rolling stock, Network SouthEast winning the business case for new 'Networker' trains.
From April 1994, the InterCity business was fragmented vertically and horizontally. It surrendered the vertical integration of the infrastructure. Railtrack took possession, with it's 10 geographical zones. What some might find surprising is that InterCity West Coast handed over the WCML to Railtrack with just one speed restriction!
The 'sub sectors' were reorganised. Gatwick Express pulled away from Anglia in 1993 to become effectively the first shadow franchise. The division of the 'profit centres' (where necessary) also took place. InterCity Midland Mainline/Cross Country split to allow the latter to move to Birmingham to set up as an independent structure.
As an aside, InterCity won three major concessions in 1993. The first was the retention of the brand to cover all 'intercity' related franchises, the second was a co-ordinated marketing regime to stitch the 'intercity' related franchises together from a sales and marketing point of view, the third was retention of On-Board-Services to provide a continuity of catering service.
In reality, all disappeared in the fullness of time. The InterCity brand became useful in the early (shadow) franchise days when it's awareness became useful in literally pointing confused passengers in the right direction.
The marketing focus as the Train Operating Companies (TOCs) became 'TOC-centric' meant that their new image(s) and branding dispersed InterCity as a continuous brand. For example, East Coast and West Coast couldn't have been more different, GNER becoming a flagship for sleek, classy and even nostalgic travel while Virgin was seen as more youthful, vibrant and dynamic in it's culture.
The catering went the same way as franchisees negotiated their own supplier deals and rehashed catering depending on trains or requirements. The cohesiveness of catering brand awareness disappeared; GNER and One retaining restaurant services, Virgin West Coast offering complimentary cuisine on it's trains to name but a few.
So, in conclusion, could 'InterCity' ever be used again and/or reborn? Probably not in the current environment as the structure is most definitely franchise-geography orientated. It is ironic that many rail networks across the world use 'InterCity' as a brand to differentiate their long distance train services from other services. The UK does not. However, InterCity was able to deliver a railway to the UK population on a commercial basis rather than an operational one which was a sea-change in itself. It also ended up realising the changes it fought for, in terms of tilting high speed trains on a rebuilt West Coast network - but at a cost.
InterCity deserves it's place in history. We are proud to deliver just one small part of it.
© Rail-Blue Charters 2008